America's Five Consensuses on China and the "Non - Consensus" Parts

Previously, the author wrote articles like Seeking Logic in Chaos: America's True Political Consensus and Two "Solar Systems": The Global Order in the Post - Trump Era from America's Perspective, introducing some major consensuses among Trump's government team, Washington's bipartisan politicians, and the American establishment on the future international order beyond Trump as an individual, that is, the content that all parties roughly agree on.

Now, let's introduce some basic consensuses of Washington's bipartisan and establishment circles on China and China - US relations. Note that we should focus on the consensus parts, as they are more likely to be translated into specific policies.

I. Five Consensuses in US China Policy

Here are five major consensuses on China among Washington's bipartisan, different political groups, and civil society.

Consensus 1: China is America's greatest competitor, surpassing the Soviet Union during the Cold War in strength

China is the country closest in strength to the US in modern history. It's an unprecedented competitor to the US in military, economic, and technological aspects, engaging in all - round "strategic competition" with the US.

Militarily, China's military modernisation is comprehensive and sustainable, supported by its strong manufacturing and technological capabilities. Its growth speed and comprehensiveness worry Washington. China has gradually narrowed the gap with the US in many key areas, even overtaking it in some, such as naval size, hypersonic weapons, anti - ship ballistic missiles, anti - satellite technology, and drone swarms.

Economically, China's GDP has reached about 70% of the US. If calculated by purchasing power parity, China's GDP has exceeded the US for nine consecutive years, ranking first in the world. Moreover, China has become a core node of the global supply chain. The Chinese and American economies are deeply intertwined in a "you in me, me in you" competitive - cooperative relationship. This makes the US have an interdependent and reliant relationship with China. It's hard for the US to adopt a simple containment strategy against China without causing significant self - harm.

In terms of technology, China has become one of the global leaders in cutting - edge fields like 5G, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. Its patent applications have ranked first in the world for many consecutive years. The innovation speed and scale of its digital economy are remarkable. Its higher education system produces several times more STEM graduates annually than the US. Scientific paper publications in many fields have also surpassed the US. China's technological innovation has shifted from following to "running alongside" and even "leading" in some areas.

Despite some people arguing that China might collapse economically or politically in the next ten to twenty years (the "China collapse theory"), the mainstream view holds that China has developed strong comprehensive strength, unprecedentedly close to the US. It's the most powerful competitor the US has encountered as a global hegemon. Flipping through US foreign policy reviews and think - tank reports, similar analyses can often be seen. These analyses have long become the driving force behind US politics and policy - making.

Consensus 2: China poses a challenge and threat to the US

Many regard China as an existential threat to the US, believing it will ultimately affect America's way of life. How to understand this? Is it that China aims to become a new global hegemon, challenging the US militarily, encroaching on American soil, and changing America's political and institutional systems? While there are indeed people holding such views, the real consensus lies in:

1. China's rise means the decline of America's relative position. Eventually, the US will no longer be the sole superpower and will lose its global hegemony.
2. The loss of hegemony will inevitably lead to the loss of the privileges that come with it. For example, it will weaken America's dominance and influence over other countries, thereby affecting US interests in various fields such as military, economy, and technology.
3. China's system, culture, history, and civilisation have a certain appeal in their own right - which is the reason for China's successful rise. Specifically, this includes strong national mobilisation and long - term planning capabilities; pragmatic and flexible policy - making concepts and adjustment mechanisms; a unique "symbiotic" relationship between government, market, society, and individuals; strong social cohesion; and social ethical traditions with thousands of years of accumulation. These institutional advantages have made the "China model" widely influential, especially among developing countries, and highly attractive. The rise of the "China model" signifies the end of the US - constructed narrative of itself as the sole successful model ("American exceptionalism"). It also means a weakening of US "soft power" influence on other countries' systems, values, and ways of life.
4. China's rise will not only affect other countries and relatively weaken US influence but also extend to the US itself. That is, in the future, it will not be China emulating the US more, but the US emulating China more - learning from China's models, systems, policies, and practices. The West has even developed a future imagination system centred on China's development model - "Sinofuturism," characterised by state - led technological leaps, political experiments, and the revival of Eastern civilisation. This challenges the Western - dominated modernity narrative. From this perspective, it can be understood why Americans worry that China will ultimately affect and change US values and ways of life.

After establishing China's strength and the challenges it poses, next comes the consensus on how the US should respond to these challenges and threats.

Consensus 3: Reduce dependence on China and weaken China's economic influence on the US

Substance is more important than form. Therefore, the specific concepts or labels used (such as "strategic decoupling" or "derisking") are not important. What matters is seeing through the surface to the essence.

The core诉求of the US consensus are two - fold:

First, reduce dependence on China in key areas. From the perspectives of national security and economic security, in all strategic industries related to national livelihood and influencing great - power competition and power status, build a set of industrial systems independent of China. That is, from raw materials, energy, key technologies, production equipment, production processes to the production of finished products, all should not rely on China. The aim is to establish a complete supply chain outside of China. The key industries involved include critical mineral resources, clean energy technologies, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing, advanced manufacturing (including drones, robots, etc.), biomedicine and public health, and more.

The "non - consensus" part of the US mainly lies in whether these industries/supply chains should be brought back to the US mainland (to revive US manufacturing) or whether a certain degree of "friendly outsourcing" can be relied upon. We can see that on advanced chip manufacturing (mainly produced by TSMC in Taiwan) and the manufacturing of Apple iPhones, there are clear divisions within the US.

Second, reduce US economic dependence on China to weaken China's ability to constrain US geo - strategy and strengthen US dominance in China policy. Essentially, this is the "decoupling" logic - reducing mutual economic interdependence. However, it doesn't necessarily target specific industries. When implemented, it often tends to be "asymmetric" (i.e., promoting US interests and suppressing Chinese interests) and starts with sensitive strategic industries.

Specific directions include:

Trade: Reducing US dependence on Chinese - made goods (reducing US - China trade volume and China's trade surplus with the US, and lowering the proportion of US - China trade in US global trade); restricting US - provided services to China (services involving technological competition, industrial policies, and security; entertainment and cultural fields with ideological output may be exceptions; there is significant controversy in the education/study - abroad sector).

Investment: Reducing two - way investment between the US and China, which involves restricting Chinese investment in the US and US investment in China. Investment is inevitably closely related to industry attributes, that is, whether the relevant industries or targets involve strategic competition and games between the US and China. In the medium and long term, the US may also want to reduce its reliance on China for US Treasury bonds - although this is difficult to implement. Washington and the public also hope to see US companies reduce investment in China, weakening their motivation to engage in political lobbying to safeguard their interests in China.

Consensus 4: Seek to restrict the development and catching - up of China's strategic industries

To maintain an advantage in strategic competition with China, the US needs to preserve its edge in key technological and industrial fields. On the one hand, this requires the US to continue developing in these areas. On the other hand, it involves seeking to restrict China's development and catching - up in these fields.

To achieve the latter, the US has two approaches:

One is passive defence, which means avoiding the transfer of resources, including experience, technology, talent, and capital, to the relevant fields in China. The other is active offence, which involves striking against Chinese enterprises and entities in these fields, such as adding them to various entity lists and implementing technology export controls. In practice, the boundary between passive defence and active offence is often blurred and hard to define clearly.

Based on this consensus, many future trends can be predicted;

• Severing commercial and technological links between enterprises. In the relevant fields, cooperation between US enterprises and Chinese entities will be subject to increasingly strict scrutiny and restrictions. This is because the US fears that any form of commercial cooperation may ultimately lead to US enterprises transferring key technologies and capabilities to the Chinese side, or empowering the development of Chinese entities. Here, it's necessary to consider the distrust from Washington and the public towards large multinational corporations: they believe that enterprises are purely profit - driven and do not consider US interests and security. To gain access to the Chinese market, they are willing to concede US technologies. Based on this, in addition to existing policies and frameworks (mainly technology export controls), in the medium and long term, the US may introduce more legislation and policies. US - related enterprises' investments in China (such as setting up R & D centres), sharing technology in any form, cultivating talent in China, or hiring Chinese - origin employees will be subject to stricter scrutiny. Similarly, Chinese investments in key US - sector enterprises, if they go beyond purely financial investments, will also face strict restrictions, as the US worries that such investments may serve as a "back door" for the Chinese side to obtain commercial and technological secrets.
• Cutting financial and capital - related links (financial decoupling). In addition to restricting Chinese investments in key US - sector industries, the most important aspect is to restrict US capital and financial markets from supporting China's key industries. It's also necessary to consider that the Washington public has always been highly suspicious of Wall Street, believing that financial capital is purely profit - driven and never considers US security and interests. Ultimately, it can only rely on government legislation and policies. The relevant spirit and implementation direction have been fully reflected in the "American First Investment Policy" signed by Trump. The medium - and long - term trend is financial decoupling: in the relevant strategic - sector industries, US capital will not invest in Chinese enterprises and projects, and US securities markets will not serve as financing platforms for Chinese enterprises. The purpose, of course, is to restrict the development of Chinese enterprises.
• Breaking academic and research - related links (academic decoupling). With the intensification of US - China technological competition, it can be expected that more and more professions and fields will be designated by the US as having strategic attributes. Consequently, the US will restrict Chinese students from studying and visiting in these fields, limit academic exchanges and cooperation between scholars of the two countries in these areas, and restrict Chinese - origin individuals from holding positions in key US - sector industries and technological fields.

So, which industries and technological fields are involved? The "American First Investment Policy" lists key industries, critical fields, and critical infrastructure, including semiconductors and integrated circuits, artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum information science, advanced communications, biotechnology, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, and more. It also explicitly states that the list will be continuously expanded and extended based on industrial and technological developments. It can be imagined that all cutting - edge technological fields that could impact the US - China competitive landscape will be included in the restricted scope. Amid the rapid development of artificial intelligence and the increasing intensity of competitive dynamics, decoupling in key fields is likely to accelerate further.

As for whether "reverse operations" are allowed, there is no consensus in the US. So - called "reverse operations" refer to Chinese enterprises investing in the US to conduct R & D and production, bringing key - field technologies to the US. On this issue, Trump was supportive, but there are significant differences among different political parties and politicians. The public is more receptive to it because Chinese investment can bring jobs with no apparent losses to the US. However, this issue is more for the Chinese government to be concerned about and managed.

Consensus 5: Decoupling in sensitive areas while maintaining contact in non - sensitive ones

Whether it's the establishment - oriented Biden administration or the populist - right - wing Trump administration (including the trade hawks within it), the US side emphasises that the so - called "decoupling" between China and the US is at most "strategic." The US has no intention of "full - scale decoupling" with China.

Is there a contradiction between "strategic decoupling" and "full - scale decoupling"? The answer is: no. First, the Chinese and American economies are deeply intertwined, and full - scale decoupling is almost impossible to achieve and does not serve the overall interests of the US. In other words, it's unnecessary. Thus, the US policy community has introduced the concept of "strategic decoupling," which stresses maintaining a distance from China in key areas and sensitive technologies while keeping normal economic and trade relations in other fields. This concept has gained broad recognition from both parties and has become the basic framework for US China policy.

Ultimately, "strategic decoupling" focuses on three aspects:

First, reducing the overall US economic dependence on China (in reality, China is also seeking to reduce its dependence on the US market, with both countries moving in a diversified direction).

Second, in key areas, sensitive fields, and strategic domains involving US national security and vital interests as well as great - power competition, reducing and even cutting ties with China to achieve decoupling.

Third, maintaining normal economic and trade relations with China in all "non - sensitive" areas. This can be further broken down into:

1. Chinese - made goods exported to the US that do not involve US security or strategic interests in "non - sensitive" areas - from Christmas trees and Lululemon products to general manufacturing items. These goods may be manufactured in China under American brands, Chinese brands, or third - country brands. Of course, the US establishment hopes more industries can reshore to the US. However, except for a few extreme trade hawks in the Trump administration, most people are aware that labour - intensive industries relying on large - scale supply chain systems are unlikely to systemically return to the US. Americans, to purchase affordable goods and maintain their original way of life, cannot do without the global supply chain. For the average consumer, it doesn't matter whether the manufacturing is in China, Vietnam, or Mexico, as long as the production is most efficient, the quality is the best, and the price is the cheapest. This is an economic reality.
2. Goods and services sold by US - based enterprises in the Chinese market. Currently, the annual sales of US - funded enterprises in China amount to as high as 500 billion US dollars (almost equivalent to China's total exports to the US). The US - China service trade exceeds 90 billion US dollars (with a surplus of over 20 billion US dollars for the US). The industries involved include consumer goods and retail (from Apple, Starbucks to Nike), automobile manufacturing (such as General Motors, Ford, Tesla), industry and manufacturing (like General Electric, Honeywell), healthcare (such as Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer), financial services, and other professional services. Most of these industries, especially the vast consumer goods sector, fall under "non - sensitive" areas. The US government not only allows but also encourages US enterprises to maintain normal economic and trade relations with China in these fields. After all, the US reaps significant commercial benefits and exerts cultural influence over China. The core issue is that the gains from globalisation are captured by US enterprises and capital, not shared with ordinary American citizens ("uneven distribution"), which exacerbates socio - economic contradictions within the US. Thus, the US establishment is also keen to see more products manufactured domestically, but this must give way to economic realities.

This article aims to discuss the US consensus on China policy. To summarise, if "strategic decoupling" with China in sensitive areas is a consensus, then maintaining economic and trade relations with China in "non - sensitive" areas is also a consensus. It garners support from ordinary US enterprises and consumers and is an economic reality that politicians must accept.

The "Decoupling Risk Coefficient Framework"

Under the framework of "strategic decoupling" or "selective decoupling," how will China - US economic and trade relations develop in the future and what impact will it have on various industries?

To assess this, we can establish a risk - adjusted coefficient framework, evaluating the decoupling risk faced by different industries on a scale from 0 to 1: 0 indicates no risk (unaffected by decoupling), and 1 indicates high risk (facing significant decoupling risks).

The assessment criteria are primarily based on:

1. National security sensitivity (the degree of relevance to defence and security)
2. Technological advancement (the level of technology content and innovation)
3. Data sensitivity (the type and importance of data involved)
4. Supply chain criticality (the position in the global supply chain)
5. Policy attention (the level of government policy focus on the industry).

Industries or products involved in China - US economic exchanges fall somewhere along this "spectrum" between 0 and 1.

Different industries have different decoupling risk coefficients, and based on the above criteria, we can roughly assess and predict the decoupling risks for different industries (the assessment is bilateral, targeting both US and Chinese enterprises).

High - risk industries (close to 1): semiconductors and integrated circuits (0.95), artificial intelligence (0.95), quantum computing (0.90), military and defence - related industries (0.95), aerospace (0.85), advanced communication technologies (0.85)

Medium - risk industries (around 0.5): electric vehicles (0.60), biopharmaceuticals (0.55), high - end manufacturing equipment (0.65), new energy technologies (0.50), financial services (0.45), cloud computing and data centres (0.70)

Low - risk industries (close to 0): consumer goods and retail (0.10), agricultural products (0.15), traditional manufacturing (0.20), cultural and entertainment products (0.30), tourism and hotel services (0.05)

All other things being equal, the higher the risk coefficient (closer to 1), the greater the long - term decoupling risk and the more reduced economic and trade exchanges; conversely, the lower the risk coefficient (closer to 0), the less impact the decoupling risk will have in the long term.

There is a significant adjustment factor for internet - connected data and artificial intelligence - a product that can connect to the internet, absorb data, and integrate artificial intelligence will see a significant increase in its risk coefficient. Special consideration must be given to artificial intelligence. In daily life, artificial intelligence refers to generative AI (chatbots) that can input data and output content. It should be noted that prompts themselves are sensitive data (the act of asking a question can reveal a wealth of information), and output content is related to information sovereignty and ideology, both of which fall into sensitive domains. For example, if electric vehicles are internet - connected, data - capturing, and capable of integrating artificial intelligence, their risk coefficient will be significantly upgraded to that of a "high - risk industry."

Similarly, as long as content is involved and connected to ideology, values, politics, and information sovereignty, the risk coefficient will rise rapidly. The most obvious area is internet social media. (In US China policy, TikTok can be compared to Shein and Temu. Obviously, TikTok, involving social media, information dissemination, and information sovereignty, has a much higher risk coefficient than e - commerce platforms like Shein and Temu.)

The above risk - adjusted coefficients are illustrative and aim to provide an analytical framework. Industries can assess their own risk - adjusted coefficients based on their specific circumstances.

Of course, consensus on the general direction does not mean consensus on specific operations. For example, to what extent should the US maintain economic ties with China? Although the consensus is to decouple in sensitive areas and maintain contact in non - sensitive ones, overall reducing the US economy's dependence on China's, there are differences when it comes to the specific degree, depth, and breadth. Some argue for greater decoupling to secure national security, while others emphasise the reality of economic interdependence and the massive costs of full - scale decoupling. Such discussions and power plays will continue.

II. Non - Consensus Parts of US Perception and Policy Towards China

The so - called "non - consensus" parts of China policy refer to the areas of contention, disagreement, and political and policy - making struggles.

Non - consensus parts:

How to understand China's national attributes - is it a "civilisation state" (nation - state) or a political and ideological entity (a mirror image of the US)? This divergence fundamentally affects the US understanding of China's rise. For instance, is China a continuation of the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The Soviet Union was essentially a mirror image of the US, engaging in comprehensive competition with the US in military, economic, technological, institutional, and ideological spheres for dominance. Does China aim to replace the US as the new global hegemon, or does it merely wish to overturn US hegemony to support a multipolar order? Is China a preserver or a disruptor of the international order? And does China's rise truly pose an "existential threat" to the US (as opposed to general - sense impacts and challenges)?

Should the US adopt a predominantly defensive stance towards China or take a more proactive offensive posture to contain China's development? This includes whether the US should make efforts to influence and change China's systems and values ("peaceful evolution") or abandon such attempts altogether. To what extent should the US recognise China's sphere of influence in the region and internationally? Should the US defend the so - called "first island chain," and what price is it willing to pay for it? To what extent should the US interfere in the contacts between its allies and partners and China, and what price is it willing to pay? Should Taiwan be included as part of the US supply chain system, and what price is the US willing to pay for it? Or is the risk of Taiwan to the US always too great?

Will the US and China engage in military conflict? This involves two different levels of issues: the normative and the empirical. Normatively, should the US use military means to contain China, including direct war and proxy wars? Empirically, following geopolitical trends, will the US and China ultimately engage in military conflict?

Can the US draw on some of China's systems, policies, and development models, or should it be irreconcilably opposed to the Chinese model, striving to prevent China's systems, values, models, and policies from influencing, infiltrating, and "back - flowing" into the US?

How should the US view Chinese - origin and Chinese - descent talents? Considering China's unique civilisation, culture, government, and political form, how should the US regard individuals from China? Should it prevent Chinese - origin individuals from "socially" infiltrating the US?

Like the consensus areas, non - consensus areas will also continue to influence the formulation and implementation of US China policy, providing important references for understanding and responding to the US China strategy.

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