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Insights into the Liaoning Carrier from Benz's Report (Part Two)


 On the 27th, Benz's Joint Staff released a new report. Let's delve into the details within the report.

Sortie Rate


Over the two days of the 25th and 26th, a total of 120 sorties were conducted, averaging 60 per day. For comparison, during last year's United Sword B exercise, the Liaoning Carrier achieved its highest sortie rate, as detailed in "From Benz's Report to the Leap of the Carrierborne Aviation."

It hasn't yet reached the peak. However, based on previous calculations in "Some Thoughts on Carrierborne Aircraft Sortie Rate," there is a possibility of surpassing the record of 70 sorties per day. This would exceed: 1) the 50-60 sorties per day during the 2015 Charles de Gaulle Carrier's strike against ISIS; and 2) the 66 sorties per day during the Nimitz Carrier's display of force in the South China Sea from March 1 to 4, 2016. These are both flat-top catapult carriers. While the maximum sortie rate may still lag behind, the daily combat sortie rate is already quite impressive.

Sortie Batches

According to Benz's Joint Staff report:
In December 2022, as the Liaoning Carrier moved from the Miyako Strait to the waters near the Okinotorishima Island, the daily average sortie batches were 7.5 batches per day. This was while operating around the Okinawa base group, facing intense reconnaissance by the US and Japan. Later, as the Liaoning Carrier moved south toward Guam, the daily average sortie batches dropped to 5 batches per day.
In April 2023, during the Shandong Carrier's first venture into the Western Pacific, the daily sortie batches reached 7.25 batches per day. In September, during its second Western Pacific deployment, including land-based aircraft, the figure peaked at 9 batches per day. In November, during its third Western Pacific deployment, the Shandong Carrier achieved a then-record of 8.3 batches per day with its own carrierborne aircraft.
In July 2024, during the Shandong Carrier's Western Pacific deployment, the daily sortie batches reached 10 batches per day.
In October 2024, during United Sword B, the Liaoning Carrier achieved a daily average of 12.5 sortie batches per day.
It is evident that over the span of two years, there has been a very significant increase in our daily sortie batches, with the growth rate showing an upward trend.
In contrast, this time the estimated daily average is around 7.5 batches, similar to the Liaoning Carrier's sortie batches near Okinotorishima Island in 2022. Later, when the Shandong Carrier first ventured into the Western Pacific, the sortie batches were also comparable. It appears that the frequency of intense reconnaissance and harassment around the Okinawa base group by the US and Japan is roughly around 7-8 batches per day.
However, in terms of sorties per batch, there has been a noticeable increase this time. It is speculated that there are two possible reasons: one is to engage in aerial refueling to counter long-range reconnaissance aircraft like the P-3C; and the other is to counter the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's F-15Js from Naha and the US Air Force's fighters from Kadena (though not mentioned in Benz's report, they must have been active), thus increasing the number of sorties.

The Photography Issue Again

The newly emerged Nanchang warship is still photographed from the水面舰艇 (surface warship) perspective.

However, the Wuxi and Qiqihar warships, which crossed the Miyako Strait ahead of the Liaoning Carrier, have clear aerial photos.

This also reveals part of the issue.

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