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On the Details of Japan’s Liaoning Carrier Report

 


On May 25, Japan’s Joint Staff published a report on the Liaoning carrier. Here are some interesting details from it

:
  • Discovery Position: The Liaoning flotilla was spotted about 200 km north of Huangwei Island.

    Last year on September 17, the flotilla was detected near 210 km northwest of the Diaoyu Islands.

    The proximity of these positions suggests that Japan’s method and route for searching and confirming the Liaoning flotilla are similar this time.
  • Trackers: According to Japan’s report, the surface vessel involved in tracking was the Takanami from the 6th Escort Flotilla, and the aircraft was the P-3C from the 5th Air Group. The Takanami is an old acquaintance, as it also tracked the Liaoning flotilla last September. Compared to that September mission, the P-1 from Kagoshima is absent this time, or rather, the P-1 from Kagoshima failed to locate the target.
  • Relative Position: Judging from the photos released in Japan’s report, which seem to be taken from the Takanami, it is positioned on the right side of the Liaoning flotilla.

    Normally, after searching for and confirming the Liaoning, the Takanami should accompany it on the port side.

    But now it’s in this position.

    The most likely explanation is that the Takanami overshot and didn’t find the Liaoning flotilla in the predetermined contact area. It then sailed west for a while before turning south. This is quite interesting and indicates that Japan doesn’t fully the Liaoning flotilla’s movements. The turn to the south was probably guided remotely by the P-3C. However, the P-3C didn’t enter the visual confirmation range, so the Takanami eventually caught up and confirmed the flotilla. This is why Japan’s report stated that the Liaoning was detected at 7 a.m.
  • Air Self-Defense Force Deployment: Japan’s report mentioned that the Liaoning conducted carrier-based aircraft takeoffs and landings in the East China Sea, prompting the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), namely the 9th Wing from Naha, to scramble fighter jets in response. But during the September 2024 mission, despite similar aircraft operations, no ASDF planes were reported. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the P-3C was intercepted, necessitating ASDF support.

    Comparing the photos from both reports, this time all the photos seem to be taken from the Takanami. Last time, there were aerial shots. Also, from this set of photos, the Liaoning’s blast deflector hasn’t been retracted, indicating that the J-15 must have taken off.
  • Anhui Flotilla: Comparing with the Anhui flotilla that went through the Miyako Strait on May 16,

    it was detected only 100 km away from Miyako Island, with no surface vessels accompanying it—only the P-3C conducted aerial surveillance. It seems Japan was caught off guard this time. This also reflects a problem: Japan’s ability to monitor the movements of surface vessels without early intelligence warnings is lacking. Moreover, Naha Port isn’t suitable for large warships to be stationed permanently. Without prior intelligence, it’s impossible to dispatch surface vessels for search and accompaniment. This also reveals the deep collusion between the Taiwan authorities and Japan. For instance, every time the Shandong carrier heads out into the Pacific, similar situations occur.

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