Analysis of the Evolution of BLA's Tactics and Strategies (2020–2025) 2025 Train Hijacking: A Watershed Moment
On the morning of March 11, 2025, the Jaffar Express from Quetta to Peshawar entered the Bolan Pass as usual. Passengers were either dozing or gazing at the desolate Balochistan scenery. Suddenly, an IED explosion on the tracks forced the train to halt. Heavily - armed BLA militants swarmed down from the hills, surrounded the train, and took over 400 passengers, including around 100 military personnel on leave, hostage. This 36 - hour - long hijacking ended with a Pakistani special forces raid. While the authorities reported 31 casualties, theA BL claimed to have killed 214 hostages—a figure thatRegardless of its veracity, sent shockwaves of terror across Pakistan.
The Rise of the Baloch Liberation Army
The BLA, a separatist armed group founded in 2000, has deep - seated historical roots tracing back to 1948 when Balochistan was forcibly integrated into Pakistan. Balochistan, Pakistan's largest yet most underdeveloped province, is rich in natural resources like natural gas, coal, and minerals. However, the Baloch people have long felt marginalized and oppressed by the federal government. This simmering discontent has fueled decades of armed resistance.
Tactical Shift: From Guerrilla Warfare to Terrorism
Prior to 2020, the BLA primarily employed conventional mountain guerrilla tactics, such as ambushing patrols, bombing infrastructure, and raiding border outposts. These low - intensity tactics, while troublesome for security forces, had limited impact. The turning point came in 2018 when a major BLA split led to the formation of the more radical BLA - J (Jehad Group) by Aslam Baloch. This new faction revived the dormant suicide attack squads, the Marriyat Brigade, and began planning large - scale attacks.
The data reveals a startling surge: BLA factions' claimed attacks rose from about 50 in 2019 to nearly 90 in 2021, skyrocketed to 200 in 2022, and hit over 300 in 2024. This "geyser - like" increase reflects a comprehensive tactical upgrade.
The Shock of Female Suicide Bombers
In April 2022, a 30 - year - old Baloch schoolteacher, Shari Baloch, detonated herself outside a vehicle of the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi, killing four people, including three Chinese teachers. This marked the first female suicide bombing in Baloch separatist history, with psychological impacts far exceeding the actual casualties.
In June 2023, a second female attacker, Sumaiya Kalandrani, carried out a suicide attack on a Pakistani military convoy in Turbat. The BLA declared, "The era of women's active participation in armed struggle has begun," signaling a deliberate strategic shift.
The New Tactics of Short - Term Occupation
The BLA has also experimented with short - term town occupation tactics. In 2024, BLA - J launched "Black Wind Operation," briefly controlling several areas in southern Balochistan. In January 2025, BLA - A executed "Karachi Operation," temporarily seizing the Manguchar town and nearby military camps. These "occupy - strike - retreat" operations demonstrate the BLA's maturing tactical thinking.
Anti - Chinese Projects Become Core Strategy
Among the BLA's targets, Chinese projects and personnel have become the top priority. This is a deliberate strategic choice. The BLA opposes the massive Chinese - Pakistani Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects in Balochistan, claiming local people derive no benefits. Consequently, all CPEC - related targets—ports, energy infrastructure, and Chinese nationals—are labeled primary targets.
A series of bloody incidents highlights the escalation of this anti - Chinese strategy:
In November 2018, the BLA attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi, killing four people; in June 2020, it struck the Karachi Stock Exchange, partly owned by Chinese investors; the April 2022 Confucius Institute bombing resulted in three Chinese teachers' deaths.
In August 2021, a BLA suicide bomber targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers near Gwadar Port. The BLA called it a "self - sacrifice" attack aimed at disrupting CPEC.
According to Indian intelligence, the BLA now has around 5,000 fighters and has acquired US - made equipment flooding the market after the US withdraw from Afghanistan. These new - age weapons have significantly enhanced its combat capabilities.
A Complex Network of Separatist Groups
The BLA does not operate in isolation. Balochistan is home to multiple separatist armed groups that both compete and cooperate, forming a complex alliance network.
In 2018, major Baloch armed organizations formed the "Baloch National Liberation Alliance" (BRAS), including BLA - J, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), and the Baloch Republican Guard (BRG). This alliance enables previously independent armed groups to coordinate actions and launch larger - scale attacks.
BRAS's coordination is impressive. In August 2024, on the eve of Pakistan's Independence Day, BRAS claimed 45 attacks across 42 Baloch regions. On March 27, 2025, during the anniversary of Balochistan's annexation by Pakistan, BRAS boasted of launching 88 attacks.
However, internal divisions also exist. The BLA is split into the radical BLA - J and the relatively moderate BLA - A. In 2024, BLA - A's attacks surged from under 40 the previous year to 154, seen as a counter to BLA - J's dominance.
In March 2025, BLA - A launched its first female suicide attack and revived its Marriyat Brigade, emphasizing it was the "authentic" Marriyat unit. This "bidding" dynamic of escalating attack intensity has further intensified the Baloch conflict.
The Shadow of Foreign Forces
The BLA's rapid development and equipment upgrades would not be possible without foreign support. The Pakistani government has always accused India of being the main backer of the BLA.
This accusation is not without basis. In 2016, Pakistan arrested former Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav, accusing him of being an Indian intelligence agent conducting espionage and sabotage in Balochistan. Despite India's denial, Pakistan widely publicizes this case as concrete evidence of Indian involvement.
Afghanistan is another complex factor. For a long time, southern Afghan provinces like Kandahar and Helmand have served as sanctuaries and logistical bases for Baloch armed groups. Although the Taliban's 2021 return to power changed the situation, the BLA still maintains some operational capacity in southern Afghan mountains.
Financially, the BLA has diversified income sources: extortion, drug smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, illegal mining, and donations from overseas Baloch communities. The UN estimates that the annual illegal drug trade through Balochistan amounts to tens of billions of dollars, from which the BLA collects substantial revenue.
The Information Warfare: Propaganda and Counter - propaganda
Modern conflicts are not only fought on battlefields but also in the realm of public opinion. The BLA understands this well and has established a comprehensive propaganda mechanism.
After each major attack, the BLA quickly issues official statements, sending them via email to international media or posting them on social platforms. They focus on shaping "heroic images"—releasing attackers' photos and names, labeling them "martyrs," and widely disseminating their stories.
For instance, the photo of female attacker Shari Baloch (in a traditional robe with two children) spread widely the day after the attack, promoting the narrative that "even mothers and teachers are willing to sacrifice for freedom."
The BLF also regularly publishes the electronic magazine Asper, using vivid text and images to propagate Baloch nationalism and anti - Chinese content.
In terms of information manipulation, the BLA often exaggerates attack outcomes for psychological warfare. In the 2025 train hijacking, while the military reported 31 hostage deaths, the BLA claimed to have killed 214. Though this inflated figure is dubious, it successfully sowed panic.
From Rudimentary Arms to Modern Insurgency
The BLA's weaponry is also upgrading. In addition to traditional IEDs and small arms, they are now using advanced remote - detonation technology, satellite communication devices, and night - vision equipment.
Reports indicate the BLA has established a dedicated intelligence agency, ZIRAB, responsible for pre - war intelligence and tactical guidance. Since its first exposure in October 2024, ZIRAB has been deeply involved in planning every major attack.
Within BLA - J, there are four special units: the Marriyat Brigade (suicide squads), the Special Tactics Operational Squad (STOS), the "Fatah" Vanguard, and the ZIRAB intelligence agency. This professional division of labor enables more complex coordinated attacks.
In communication, the BLA uses encrypted messaging apps and satellite phones to avoid military surveillance. The August 2024 BRAS - organized 42 - location simultaneous attacks must have involved meticulous communication coordination among armed groups.
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