From Legal Isolation to Military Deterrence

A recent report by China Central Television (CCTV) has officially confirmed that China’s two aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, have joined forces in the Western Pacific. This development corroborates the information released by the Japanese Joint Staff on June 8 and 9 regarding the movements of these two carriers. So, what does this convergence signify?

Let’s start with a well-known statement: “The Taiwan issue is purely China’s internal affair and brooks no external interference.” This has been reiterated since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, yet external interference has never ceased. The reason is straightforward: Until now, China could only assert its sovereignty and isolate separatist forces in Taiwan from a legal standpoint, but lacked the capability to effectively deter external military interference.

However, the meeting of the two carriers in the Western Pacific marks a fundamental shift in the situation. Currently, the vast waters between the First and Second Island Chains are dominated by China’s carrier battle groups. According to the Japanese Joint Staff’s reports, the fleet includes two carriers, four Type 055 destroyers, five Type 052D destroyers, six Type 054A frigates, and three supply ships, with a total displacement of 370,000 tons and a total of 1,056 vertical launch system (VLS) cells. This tonnage already surpasses that of the French Navy and ranks seventh globally.

In comparison, the U.S. Navy’s Carrier Strike Group centered around the USS Ronald Reagan includes one carrier, one Ticonderoga-class cruiser, and two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, with 304 VLS cells; the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group has one carrier and three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, with 288 VLS cells. Except for the number of carrier-based aircraft, the U.S. dual-carrier groups do not hold an advantage in other aspects, including the air surveillance system, which includes carrier-based early warning aircraft. Although the Liaoning and Shandong currently deploy early warning helicopters on their decks, the term “wide-area sensor system” is so broad that it is impossible to know exactly what other capabilities might be involved.

Moreover, the two U.S. carriers are currently positioned at the edges of the First and Second Island Chains. The USS Ronald Reagan has just returned to Yokosuka and hurriedly departed again on June 10—driven by overwhelming public and strategic pressure. The USS Nimitz is still near the Scarborough Shoal, with its next move yet to be confirmed. The distance between these two carriers is too great to form a pincer movement; instead, China’s dual-carrier group has seized the advantageous interior position. This development clearly signals to the world that the era of external military interference is over.

Previously, there has been much discussion about the “front line of military power.” As mentioned in the article “Actions Speak Louder Than Words,” the current situation has changed dramatically.

Of course, the strategic implications of this are enormous, and it is something the United States is extremely reluctant to accept. Therefore, it must find ways to mitigate the impact. As speculated in the article “What Is the USS Ronald Reagan Up To?”:

The current deployment of the USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan aligns with the previously mentioned arrangement of one strike group in each of the First and Second Island Chains, forming a layered defense. However, with the convergence of China’s dual carriers, this layout has been disrupted. Moving forward, the United States has two potential options:

1. Confrontation with China
   The USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan could both move closer to China’s carrier groups, adopting a tough stance and potentially even forming a four-carrier showdown. This would be an extremely aggressive move. Whether the United States is still capable, willing, or even daring to take such an action today is a major question. Particularly for the USS Nimitz, the only shortcut to engage in such a maneuver would be through the Bashi Channel or the Balintang Channel, which could easily lead to a repeat of the USS Ronald Reagan’s experience in November 2023, when it was non-cooperatively monitored by land-based, sea-based, and air-based forces in the southeast as it passed through the Bashi Channel.

   

   
   

Given the U.S. track record over the past few years, I personally believe the likelihood of this scenario is very low.

2. Defensive Maneuvering + Offensive Propaganda
   This involves moving the two carrier strike groups toward the Second Island Chain for defensive deployment—a military move. At the same time, leveraging the remaining propaganda advantage to launch a campaign like “U.S. Carriers in the Western Pacific,” emphasizing “solidarity with allies” to boost their confidence while discrediting China. This is a diplomatic move.

The USS Nimitz serves as a crucial reference point here. If the United States lacks confidence, the USS Nimitz might retreat to the Second Island Chain as speculated. If it still has confidence, the USS Nimitz might linger in the South China Sea to demonstrate a restraining presence.

Of course, all of the above is purely speculative. We will have to wait and see how the situation unfolds.