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On the J-15 Intercepting Japan's P-3C in Relation to the Shandong Carrier Group


According to reports from various sources, on June 11, Japan's Ministry of Defense announced that a Japanese P-3C aircraft was intercepted and driven away by a Chinese J-15 fighter while monitoring the Chinese Navy's Shandong aircraft carrier battle group on June 7 and 8.

Both the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of National Defense have responded to the incident.
However, there is something interesting to note:
What about the report on June 11?
The incident took place on June 7 and 8, and Japan had already released a report on the Shandong on June 9, mentioning the P-3C's aerial surveillance. So, why did the June 9 report make no mention of the interception?
Also, pay attention to the timing. Japan confirmed the location of the Shandong group at 1:00 PM on June 7, but the report states that the P-3C was intercepted between 10:30 AM and 11:40 AM on the same day. This means that the P-3C was intercepted before it could confirm the exact location of the Shandong. Its mission was to use radar and optical reconnaissance to locate the Shandong and then guide the surface vessels (in this case, the Murasame-class destroyer "Ikazuchi") to the relevant waters for visual confirmation.
The report also states: "On June 9 (Monday), it was confirmed that the carrier 'Shandong' was conducting takeoff and landing operations of carrier-based fighters and helicopters."

The P-3C was intercepted again on June 8, but Japan only confirmed the Shandong's aircraft operations on June 9. In other words, the Ikazuchi was likely kept at a distance on June 7 and 8 and was unable to visually confirm the Shandong. So, how did Japan confirm it on June 7? Judging from the photos, it must have been through long-range snapshots taken by the P-3C on June 7.
The photo in the report was taken from the north, and judging by the angle of the sunlight, the time was around noon (corresponding to the 1:00 PM confirmation mentioned in the report).
Now, let's look at the interception on June 8. According to the two photos released by Japan (marked as taken on June 8) and sorted by time:
The first photo is around 2:00 PM. The J-15 was heading south, with the P-3C to its west. According to standard practice, the protected target should be to the east.

The second photo is around 2:40 PM. The J-15 was heading north or northwest, with the P-3C still to its west. The protected target remained to the east.

Combining the information from Japan's report, the confrontation on June 8 took place between 2:00 PM and 3:00 PM. From the two photos, it is clear that the P-3C was kept to the west of the target and was unable to get close. According to Japan's account, the J-15 took relatively aggressive measures to intercept the P-3C (crossing 900 meters ahead of the P-3C's flight path at the same altitude). As for the effectiveness of the interception, it can be inferred from Japan's report—had there been any clearer photos of the Shandong's operations than the blurry ones from June 7, Japan would not have used those vague images.

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