At 1 a.m. on June 1, 2025, alarms blared at Russian bomber bases. "Operation Web," 18 months in the making, was underway across five time zones. One hundred and seventeen small drones emerged from hidden wooden sheds in trucks, targeting Russia's prized strategic assets.
This was more than a military strike. It was a textbook example of modern intelligence warfare. Ukraine used open-source intelligence (OSINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) to create a deadly network deep behind enemy lines. From the Arctic Circle near Murmansk to the Belaya base in Siberia, Ukrainian agents had been quietly lurking under the FSB's nose. Using commercial drones, they targeted a $7 billion strategic bomber fleet. This operation redefined asymmetric warfare and exposed the structural weaknesses of traditional intelligence defense systems.
The success of Operation Web was rooted in 18 months of careful preparation and phased infiltration. Starting at the end of 2023, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) began this Hollywood-style intelligence operation. Unlike traditional large-scale military raids, Operation Web adopted a "divide and conquer, infiltrate in batches" strategy. One hundred and seventeen modified FPV drones were hidden in specially designed wooden sheds and smuggled into Russia disguised as regular cargo.
The brilliance of this infiltration lay in its deep understanding of Russia's border checks and internal security. Ukrainian intelligence personnel took full advantage of the lax transportation inspections across Russia's vast territory. They hid drones under fake wooden roofs, mixed with everyday goods. In each target city, the operation team set up drone-carrying trucks near air force bases. This created a vast network across five states and five time zones. Shockingly, Ukrainian agents even rented a property next to the FSB office in Murmansk Oblast as a forward command post. This bold move showed their courage and deep understanding of Russia's intelligence operations.
On the technical side, Operation Web demonstrated Ukraine's ability to integrate intelligence technologies. FPV drones used in the operation were low-cost "mini killers" made from commercial parts, costing only hundreds of dollars each. Yet they could damage strategic bombers worth hundreds of millions. To improve accuracy, Ukraine even used Soviet plane models in the Kyiv Aviation Museum to train the drones' AI recognition systems. This fusion of commercial technology and AI algorithms reflected Ukraine's flexible and pragmatic approach to technology selection.
In case of signal loss, some drones could switch to AI mode, follow pre-planned routes, and activate combat units after locking onto targets. This human-machine combined strike mode greatly improved the success rate and precision of the operation.
The success of Operation Web was closely supported by precise open-source intelligence (OSINT). Ukrainian analysts used commercial satellite images and public data to track the movements of Russian bombers. When the Russians moved bombers to Murmansk and Siberia to avoid previous Ukrainian attacks, Ukraine had already detected this through open-source satellite monitoring. Satellite photos taken a week before the attack showed that Olenya base had about 40 Tu-22M3s and 11 Tu-95MS bombers, about 20% of Russia's strategic air force.
Ukrainian personnel also gathered environmental and security information about targets inside Russia through social media and local news. They used Google Earth and other public mapping tools to draw detailed base plans, marking the locations of aprons, fuel depots, and air defense radar positions.
On the human intelligence (HUMINT) front, Operation Web showed the high professionalism and strong organizational skills of Ukrainian agents. Each target had a team of two or three people who arrived days earlier for final preparations. These teams included Ukrainian agents who had long infiltrated Russia and possibly Russian assistants. They may have recruited some Russian citizens dissatisfied with the current regime to provide transportation, cover sites, or intelligence updates. To ensure absolute secrecy, all teams communicated only through encrypted channels with the Ukrainian headquarters and had minimal contact with each other. This strict confidentiality and professional withdrawal plan allowed all participants to safely leave Russia before the attack, with no one captured by the Russians.
In terms of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cyber warfare, Ukraine likely intercepted real-time Russian air defense and communication information to assess the alert levels and duty status of target bases. Coordinating drone attacks across five locations required precise timing and control. Ukraine probably used satellite communication or high-frequency encrypted radios to coordinate communication between sleeper cells and drone platforms.
The success of Operation Web mirrored the structural flaws in Russia's intelligence security architecture. The fragmented nature of Russia's intelligence system was fully exposed. The Federal Security Service (FSB) focuses more on political surveillance and internal stability, with weak protection of military targets and warnings against unconventional attacks. The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) mainly focuses on foreign intelligence and battlefield reconnaissance, with limited involvement in domestic security. This functional separation and lack of coordination between intelligence agencies provided opportunities for Ukrainian agents. When Ukrainian intelligence groups operated in Russia for a long time, no agency took full responsibility for suspicious activities—the FSB might have seen some clues as military matters and not investigated thoroughly, while military security departments might have relied on the FSB for warnings.
Russia's intelligence system also showed problems of long reaction chains and slow decision-making. Traditionally, Russian intelligence agencies need to report threats through multiple layers, with decisions often centralized at the top level, preventing frontline personnel from responding quickly. When explosions occurred at bases in Murmansk and Irkutsk, other regions did not go on maximum alert in time, missing the chance to strengthen defenses before subsequent drone attacks. This fragmented information led to isolated units unable to form a unified defense. The Russian Ministry of Defense did not release a unified statement until evening, admitting drone attacks in five regions. This means that in the hours after the attacks, information was not timely summary and reported, nor was it instantly shared with other potential target units.
The most shocking aspect of Operation Web was the huge disparity between input and output. According to Ukraine's Security Service, the attack damaged or destroyed 41 Russian military aircraft, equivalent to 34% of Russia's long-range bomber fleet used for launching cruise missiles. Ukraine estimates that this caused about $7 billion in equipment losses for Russia, while the 117 modified drones used probably cost only hundreds of thousands of dollars. This "low-cost, high-impact" model perfectly embodies the core concept of modern asymmetric warfare. As experts say, we have entered an era of "precision quality" warfare. The combination of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons, precision guidance, and commercial manufacturing enables low-cost precision strikes for almost any country or armed group.
The brilliance of Operation Web lay not only in its technical execution but also in its psychological warfare design. By publicly disclosing the details of the operation instead of keeping it secret, Ukraine triggered shockwaves within Russia. By revealing how the mission was carried out, Ukraine weaponized paranoia. Now, every truck in Russia is a potential threat, and every driver is a suspect. After the attack, regions like Irkutsk saw massive traffic jams as authorities began systematically checking trucks. Surveillance and internal security resources were diverted to monitor tens of thousands of miles of highways, slowing military and civilian logistics, casting suspicion on contractors, creating bottlenecks, and eroding trust. The value of this psychologicalintimidation effect may far exceed the direct material losses.
Operation Web clearly showed the fundamental differences in intelligence technology paths between Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian intelligence tends to adopt flexible commercial technologies and asymmetric means, skillfully combining low-cost drones with AI algorithms to respond to challenges in an agile way. In contrast, Russia relies on traditional heavy-asset technologies and closed systems. Its large-scale space-based and radar early warning systems could not counter small drones hidden in civilian facilities. This difference in technical paths reflects two distinct philosophies of war: one is a modern mindset of flexibility and rapid iteration; the other is a traditional model dependent on heavy equipment and pursuing scale advantages. In today's fast - paced Informationization and intelligenceization development, the former is clearly more adaptable and vital.
At the organizational culture level, Ukraine's and Russia's intelligence systems also show stark differences. Since 2014, Ukraine's intelligence sector has undergone reforms, gradually abandoning the rigid Soviet-style approach and fostering a culture of flexibility and innovation. Ukrainian intelligence officers are often given significant autonomy, encouraged to innovate on the spot and make quick decisions, creating a "pragmatic and victory - oriented" cultural direction. On the other hand, Russia's intelligence agencies have a culture more inclined to top - down command and control with strict hierarchy.基层人员 often mechanically follow instructions, lacking room for independent adaptation and appearing sluggish in responding to unconventional threats. This cultural difference is reflected in actual combat as Ukraine's ability to achieve more with less, while Russia finds itself in the awkward situation of "heavy - asset slow - motion."
The success of Operation Web sounds an alarm for traditional intelligence security systems. In the face of new - era security threats, relying on a single intelligence source is no longer sufficient. There must be deep integration of multiple intelligence methods such as OSINT, HUMINT, and SIGINT. As experts say, the ideal result is the fusion of these two intelligence collection platforms. SIGINT provides additional asset verification, confirmation, and review capabilities for HUMINT operations, while HUMINT offers key information acquisition for SIGINT collectors.
Traditional defense concepts are often based on the assumption of "big threats and big targets," focusing on preventing large - scale external attacks. However, Operation Web proved that real threats may come from within, from seemingly harmless "small and scattered" attack methods. The commander of the U.S. Northern Command admitted that in 2024 alone, there were 350 incidents of drones intruding into U.S. military bases. This shows that no matter how powerful a military force is, it needs to re - examine its security protection system.
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