A meticulously planned and precise strike
Under the cover of darkness on the night of June 12 to 13, 2025, a shocking event unfolded in the Middle East. Israel launched a large-scale airstrike operation, codenamed "Operation Rising Lion," targeting Iran. This meticulously planned military action not only destroyed multiple Iranian nuclear facilities and military bases, but also delivered a devastating blow to Iran’s military leadership through a precise decapitation strike.
The first explosion over Tehran shattered the long-standing "air defense myth" that Iran had painstakingly built over the years. Iran had claimed the ability to detect any aerial threat within a 3,000-kilometer range, yet Israel’s aircraft penetrated its defenses with ease. This airstrike was more than just a military operation; it was a showdown between intelligence and counterintelligence, and a decisive contest between air defense systems and penetration technology. As the smoke cleared, the vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defense system were laid bare for the world to see.
Lethal Ambush: Intelligence Penetration and Command Paralysis
Analysis One: The Perfect Trap and Precision Decapitation
The most staggering aspect of this airstrike was the extraordinary penetration capability demonstrated by Israel’s intelligence agencies. According to senior Israeli security officials, Israeli intelligence successfully "fooled" the top brass of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, luring several commanders to a meeting at an underground command center in Tehran. Subsequently, Israeli aircraft launched a precision strike on this center, eliminating some of Iran’s top military leaders. The results were staggering: Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Mohammad Bagheri, and the Commander of the IRGC, General Hossein Salami, were among the many senior officers killed in the attack. According to Reuters, citing regional sources, at least 20 Iranian senior commanders were killed, including the Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh.
Analysis Two: The Intelligence Puzzle and the Art of Deception
Behind this remarkable outcome was the deep penetration of Iran’s command system by Israeli intelligence agencies. Israel not only knew the time and location of the Iranian high-level meeting but also manipulated the flow of information to lure the Iranian generals into a trap. This level of penetration is truly alarming—Iran’s most confidential command communications may have been fully monitored or decrypted by Israel. What’s more shocking is that Iran, despite being in a state of high tension with Israel, failed to take adequate security measures. According to conventional security principles, Iran should have ensured that its high-level command centers were dispersed, with encrypted communications and robust cover and camouflage. However, the main generals of the IRGC Air Force all attended the same meeting, and this underground command center was unable to withstand the direct destruction of penetrating precision munitions. This intelligence failure directly led to Iran’s "loss of the most critical human nodes in its air defense system." With the command center decapitated, the remaining air defense forces were leaderless and slow to respond on the night of the airstrike. This partly explains why Iran failed to organize effective counterattacks or interception actions in the hours following the attack.
"Blind" Air Defense: The Complete Collapse of the Early Warning System
Analysis One: The Tragedy of Radar—Swift Paralysis of Key Nodes
Theoretically, Iran has a multi-layered early warning radar network covering the entire country, with systems like the Khatam radar capable of detecting incoming threats at long distances. However, in reality, Israel’s aircraft and missiles penetrated Iranian airspace almost unimpeded, and Iran failed to issue a timely and effective nationwide air defense alert. The first wave of Israel’s airstrike targeted Iran’s air defense "eyes"—radar stations across the country. Reports indicate that Israel quickly achieved "complete suppression" of Iran’s western air defense system: dozens of radars and surface-to-air missile launchers were destroyed, leaving Iran’s air defense network partially blind.
Analysis Two: Fragmented Detection Network—Radar Systems Operating in Isolation
More fatally, Iran’s air defense radar network suffers from severe fragmentation. An exclusive intelligence analysis revealed that even around the heavily protected Natanz nuclear facility, radar systems failed to share data, described as a "fragile and disconnected" network. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, after analyzing a segment of a command center video released by Iran, found that four different radars around Natanz were displayed on three separate screens, suggesting they did not form a unified air defense picture. Experts commented, "For such an important location, the fact that air defense perception remains fragmented is astonishing." This means that radar stations in Iran, as well as their connection with command centers, lack reliable real-time data sharing. In this situation, even if one radar detects a target, it may not be able to prompt a timely response from other areas due to delayed or disconnected information.
Analysis Three: Stealth and Electronic Warfare—The Harsh Reality of Technological Gap
Israel deployed a large number of F-35 stealth fighters in this operation. These aircraft, specifically upgraded for deep strikes into Iran, were likely undetected by Iranian radar. While Iran claims its radar can detect stealth targets, there is no empirical evidence to support this. Stealth fighters significantly reduce the effective detection range of Iranian radar, and combined with low-altitude penetration tactics, many Iranian radars may only detect the aircraft or missiles in the final minutes or even seconds before they arrive, leaving no time for interception weapons to react. Moreover, Israel’s powerful electronic warfare capabilities likely interfered with and suppressed Iranian radar. Monitoring during the airstrike showed a large amount of anti-aircraft fire in the skies over Tehran, but it did not hit any targets—this might have been the result of Iranian ground troops "blindly firing" due to radar interference and unclear targets.
The satellite image shows the tunnel construction activities in the southern part of Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment site, and marks the main construction features and entrances in detail.
Command Paralysis: Communication Breakdown and Coordination Failure
Analysis One: Centralized and Vulnerable Command System
The fact that the IRGC Air Force leadership was concentrated in a meeting and targeted indicates that Iran lacks a dispersed and redundant command mechanism during wartime. Ideally, if the main command center is attacked, secondary command centers should be able to take over quickly. However, the Israeli Ministry of Defense stated, "Most of the leadership of the IRGC Air Force was killed in the airstrike." This suggests that Iran did not effectively implement backup command. Since command authority is usually concentrated in a few top leaders, if they are all killed at the same time, subordinate units may be at a loss. The sluggish response of Iran’s air defense forces after the airstrike also confirms that there were no autonomous action guidelines in place after the command center was disabled.
Analysis Two: Service Fragmentation—Ineffective Coordination of Air Defense Forces
Iran’s air defense involves multiple parties, including the regular army, air defense forces, and the IRGC. Although there is a unified command center, the communication protocols and command systems of these units are complex, which can lead to delays or disputes during high-intensity conflicts. For example, the Iranian Air Force (part of the regular army) is theoretically responsible for intercepting incoming threats, and its fighters should have taken off to intercept during the airstrike. However, there is no indication that Iranian aircraft successfully intercepted any targets, and Israeli aircraft seemed to face little aerial resistance. This may suggest that there are problems with information sharing and coordination between the IRGC and the regular army.
Analysis Three: Fragile Communication—Information Blackout Under Electronic Warfare
Modern airstrikes are often accompanied by strong electronic warfare attacks, which first paralyze the opponent’s wireless communication network. Judging from the results, Iran’s emergency communication measures were limited. The Israeli military likely suppressed and deceived Iran’s air defense frequencies, causing communication between Iranian positions to be blocked or even receive false instructions. If Iran does not have mature anti-jamming communications (such as frequency-hopping radios, fiber-optic backup links, etc.), then under strong electromagnetic suppression from the enemy, the air defense forces will inevitably be fragmented and leaderless. The chaotic reports after the airstrike (such as some people mistaking anti-aircraft fire for the aftermath of the airstrike) also indicate that information was highly opaque at the time.
Interception Failure: The Real Performance of Weapon Systems
Analysis One: The Mysterious Absence of Main Long-Range Air Defense Missiles
Iran’s most advanced surface-to-air missile system is the S-300PMU2, but during this airstrike, the S-300 was almost non-existent. This could be due to the failure of early warning and command and control mentioned earlier, but there is also intelligence suggesting that Iran’s four S-300 systems have been damaged and are basically unusable. A report from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) pointed out that in two rounds of strikes in April and October 2024, Israel destroyed the fire control radar and other key components of Iran’s S-300 systems, rendering them paralyzed. In particular, in April 2024, the Israeli military used the "HARM" (AGM-88) anti-radiation missile to destroy an S-300 illumination radar "Tomb Stone" in central Iran. Without this most modern long-range air defense, Iran’s air defense is equivalent to losing the "top of the shield." Although Iran claims that its "Bavar-373" can replace the S-300, there is no reliable evidence to date that Bavar has successfully intercepted high-speed targets.
Analysis Two: Domestic Weapons—The Gap Between Publicity and Reality
Iran’s domestically produced medium and long-range air defense systems (such as Khordad-15, Sayyad series, etc.) have not been tested in real combat, and independent assessments generally believe their performance is not as good as claimed. For example, Iran claims that the Khordad-15 can counter stealth targets, but it has never captured a real fifth-generation aircraft. The Sayyad-3 missile claims a range of 120 kilometers, but its guidance radar and anti-saturation attack capabilities are questionable. During this airstrike, Israel launched hundreds of high-speed precision missiles, mixed with decoys and interference. If Iran’s domestic interceptors lack advanced signal processing and terminal guidance capabilities, it would be difficult to achieve successful interceptions. There were no credible reports of Iran shooting down incoming missiles or aircraft during this airstrike, which suggests that neither the Khordad nor the Tor systems achieved any results.
Analysis Three: Saturation Attack—The Ultimate Challenge for Air Defense Systems
Israel used a large number of missiles for saturation attacks. In a short period of time, hundreds of missiles coming from multiple directions posed a huge challenge to any air defense system. Although Iran’s various air defense missiles have a wide theoretical range of coverage, they may lack enough launchers and ammunition reserves to deal with so many targets at the same time. For example, a Khordad-15 battalion may have only 4-8 ready-to-fire missiles, and a Tor-M1 launcher carries 8 small missiles. After a volley, reloading takes time. Israel’s attack waves were closely spaced, with missiles coming one after another, and Iran’s air defense may have run out of ammunition, leaving no interceptors available even if targets were detected.
Strategic Vulnerabilities: Fundamental Flaws in the Air Defense System
Analysis One: The Illusion of Deterrence—Overstated Security
Iran has long used military parades and high-profile missile tests to demonstrate its air defense and missile capabilities. For example, it repeatedly claimed to have built a multi-layered "air defense wall" and boasted that any aerial attack on Iran would come at a heavy cost. This publicity created a self-deceptive and deterrent posture, which may have led to a relaxation of actual air defense preparations. Israel’s actions this time showed that Iran’s so-called strong air defense did not translate into real combat capabilities and appeared vulnerable in the face of the enemy. This exposed the fact that Iran strategically overestimated the deterrent power of its own air defense system and underestimated the determination and capabilities of its opponents to strike first.
Analysis Two: Unbalanced Defense—The Dilemma of Prioritizing Protection
Iran deployed its most elite air defense forces to guard Tehran and the vicinity of nuclear facilities, leaving other areas vulnerable. Israel could bypass the dense air defense ring around Tehran and penetrate from the periphery. Some explosions were heard in provinces such as Hamadan and Kermanshah during this airstrike, leading to speculation that Israeli missiles crossed these regions to hit targets. If the local air defense is weak, it would be difficult to intercept them en route. With limited defensive resources and a broad potential attack surface, this is a strategic dilemma that Iran faces.
Analysis Three: Strategic Isolation—The Lack of Allied Support
Compared to Israel, which has technological assistance from the United States and others, Iran is virtually on its own in the field of air defense. Although Russia sold the S-300 to Iran, it is constrained by international circumstances and will not openly intervene. Iran has tried to build a joint air defense circle with Syria and even planned to deploy air defense for Hezbollah in Lebanon, but these efforts have had little effect. Without the support of allies for early warning and air support, Iran’s air defense has to face Israel’s offensive alone. In particular, Israel may use the airspace of neighboring countries to launch attacks (for example, aircraft flying around Azerbaijan or via Gulf Arab countries), and Iran cannot actively expand its air defense depth in these directions due to the lack of permission from strategic partners.
Intelligence Insights: Profound Lessons for Modern Air Defense
Insight One: Intelligence Advantage—A Decisive Factor in Modern Warfare
From an intelligence perspective, this airstrike is a classic case that demonstrates how meticulous intelligence preparation and electromagnetic suppression can dismantle a seemingly formidable air defense system. For international security and defense analysts, it provides valuable data points to update their understanding of Iran’s military capabilities. Many previously disputed issues have been verified, such as the poor integration of Iran’s radar network; the destruction of high-value air defense assets like the S-300; and the significant vulnerabilities in the IRGC’s high-level security mechanisms. These facts are well-documented and will serve as important references for future research and defense planning.
Insight Two: Systemic Warfare—Air Defense Is Not Just a Simple Sum of Individual Weapons
This incident once again proves the decisive role of air superiority and information warfare in modern conflicts. The principle of "first achieve air superiority, then achieve victory" was fully demonstrated in Israel’s operation against Iran. For other countries, this is a warning: in the era of information warfare, it is more important to solidly improve the system’s ability to withstand attacks than to boast about one’s own weapons in isolation. The combat effectiveness of an air defense system depends not only on the performance of individual weapons but also on the robustness of the overall command architecture.
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