China, the United States and Russia have rarely agreed on anything, but they are united in their opinion that it would be better for a certain country to disappear from the face of the earth than to allow it to possess nuclear weapons.

 In a rare display of consensus, China, the United States, and Russia all agree that Japan should never be allowed to possess nuclear weapons—so much so that they would rather see Japan vanish from the face of the Earth than let it develop such weapons. This stance is rooted in a sober assessment of Japan’s history and current situation regarding nuclear issues.

Japan’s fascination with nuclear weapons dates back decades. As early as 1943, physicist Yoshio Nishina submitted a secret report to the Japanese Army Air Force, suggesting that it was feasible to enrich uranium-235 through thermal diffusion to create an atomic bomb. Subsequently, Hideki Tojo approved the “Nishina Project,” and the Japanese Navy launched the “F Project.” Although these early efforts failed due to technological limitations and deteriorating wartime conditions, Japan’s military had already shown a clear determination to pursue nuclear weapons. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the U.S. occupying forces destroyed Japan’s nuclear research facilities. However, this did not completely extinguish Japan’s nuclear ambitions.

With the onset of the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and Japan shifted, and the U.S. gradually eased its nuclear restrictions on Japan. In 1968, Japan signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), becoming a non-nuclear-weapon state party. It also announced the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in 1967. However, declassified archives have revealed a secret agreement between the U.S. and Japan allowing U.S. nuclear submarines to dock at Japanese ports. This clearly indicates a significant loophole in Japan’s “non-nuclear commitment.”

Entering the 21st century, Japan’s nuclear capabilities have increasingly drawn international attention. With advanced nuclear technology and a substantial stockpile of nuclear materials, Japan has mastered the full range of technologies from uranium enrichment to plutonium separation. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Shinzo Abe raised the issue of U.S.-Japan “nuclear sharing,” sparking intense debates within Japan’s political circles and serious concerns from neighboring countries. Although Yoshihide Suga cited the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” as a reason to reject putting “nuclear sharing” on the agenda, discussions within the Liberal Democratic Party continue, and this ambiguous attitude is deeply unsettling.

From the international community’s perspective, China, the United States, and Russia have taken a firm stance against nuclear proliferation. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference in January 2024, the three countries cited international treaties to explicitly oppose any form of nuclear proliferation. Russian strategic experts have warned that if Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons, the probability of localized nuclear conflicts in the Far East would significantly increase. The Biden administration in the U.S. has also been cautious about “nuclear sharing,” fearing that it could disrupt the strategic balance in Northeast Asia. Moreover, Japan’s decision to discharge Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the ocean has been strongly opposed by many countries, including China. Even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has deemed the discharge to be in line with safety standards, the controversy continues.

In terms of public opinion, attitudes in Japan towards nuclear issues are evolving. A 2022 survey showed that over half of the respondents supported the restart of nuclear power plants for the first time since the Fukushima disaster. While different media polls on “nuclear sharing” yield varied results, they collectively indicate that Japan’s domestic stance on nuclear issues is becoming increasingly complex.

Currently, the global risk of nuclear proliferation is on the rise. The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons failed to reach consensus on an outcome document, and some non-nuclear-weapon states are beginning to seek enhanced nuclear protection. Against this backdrop, Japan’s nuclear policy direction has profound implications for the security of Northeast Asia and the world. If Japan were to cross the line and acquire nuclear weapons, it would trigger a regional arms race and shatter the existing strategic balance.