A short dispatch from the front lines of industrial policy.
Seoul is on edge this week. On August 25 South Korea’s new President, Lee Jae-myung, will meet Donald Trump in Washington. Ordinarily a U.S.–Korea summit barely moves the KOSPI. This time Korean executives, editorial writers, and chat-room day-traders are all sweating the same headline: “Commerce Secretary Lutnick Eyes Equity Stakes in Exchange for Chip-Act Funds—Targets: Micron, TSMC, Samsung.” Samsung is Korean. That is why the anxiety is spiking.
But this is no longer a trial balloon. The template has already been executed—on an American company, no less. The victim was Intel, and the choreography was brutal.
Act I: The Ambush
August 7, with zero warning, Trump posted on Truth Social that Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan must resign “immediately” because of “serious conflicts of interest.” No details, no legal process—just a presidential shove.
August 7, with zero warning, Trump posted on Truth Social that Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan must resign “immediately” because of “serious conflicts of interest.” No details, no legal process—just a presidential shove.
Act II: The Reversal
Five days later Trump hosted Tan at Mar-a-Lago flanked by Commerce Secretary Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Bessent. After the meeting the same president lauded Tan’s “wonderful life story.” What changed? Trump teased that Tan would “submit recommendations next week.”
Five days later Trump hosted Tan at Mar-a-Lago flanked by Commerce Secretary Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Bessent. After the meeting the same president lauded Tan’s “wonderful life story.” What changed? Trump teased that Tan would “submit recommendations next week.”
Act III: The Reveal
August 22 the White House announced a signed term sheet: the U.S. government will purchase 433.3 million Intel common shares at $20.47 apiece, a $8.9 billion outlay for 9.9 % of the company. In other words, Washington just nationalized—sorry, “invested in”—one tenth of Intel.
August 22 the White House announced a signed term sheet: the U.S. government will purchase 433.3 million Intel common shares at $20.47 apiece, a $8.9 billion outlay for 9.9 % of the company. In other words, Washington just nationalized—sorry, “invested in”—one tenth of Intel.
Where did the money come from? Nowhere. The $8.9 billion is the exact subsidy Intel was promised under Biden’s 2022 CHIPS Act—money that had barely begun to flow. Trump simply converted a grant into equity. No new cash, no congressional vote—just a swap. Intel, weakened by boardroom wars and bleeding market share to AMD and TSMC, had no leverage to refuse.
Breaking Precedent
During the 2008 financial crisis Washington handed out hundreds of billions; it did not demand ownership. This is different. Intel was the guinea pig because it was already on its knees. Trump’s real targets are Samsung and TSMC—companies that actually make money.
During the 2008 financial crisis Washington handed out hundreds of billions; it did not demand ownership. This is different. Intel was the guinea pig because it was already on its knees. Trump’s real targets are Samsung and TSMC—companies that actually make money.
Samsung is next in line. Korean media report that Washington wants the same “Intel formula”: convert CHIPS subsidies into shares. Before boarding his flight to D.C., President Lee convened the heads of Korea’s five largest conglomerates—Samsung’s Lee Jae-yong at his right hand—and then announced that the group would accompany him to the White House. The Blue House communiqué used anodyne language about “deepening semiconductor cooperation,” but everyone in Seoul read the subtext: the crown jewel may be on the table.
TSMC faces the same squeeze. It has sunk $165 billion into U.S. fabs; CHIPS theoretically owes it $6.6 billion, of which only $1.5 billion has arrived. Last week TSMC signaled it would rather return the $1.5 billion than surrender a voting stake. Whether that bluff works remains to be seen.
Call it “state advance, private retreat,” call it “equity for subsidies,” or just call it expropriation. The administration that once preached free markets now practices the most candid form of industrial conscription: Washington is no longer subsidizing chip makers; it is acquiring them—one distressed company at a time.
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