Can the Rafale Escape from the PL-15?

 This question stems from a conversation I had with a friend today. So far, I tend to believe that the Rafale did not receive a radar warning signal. However, judging from the online videos, at least one Rafale fired flares before being shot down, which suggests that it might have received a missile approach warning.

So, the question essentially boils down to: Can the missile approach warning system help the Rafale evade the pursuit of the PL-15?

Let's first look at the missile approach warning system. Here is some basic information directly from Baidu.

Passive Missile Approach Warning Systems (MAWS) generally cannot provide distance information, but they can offer a longer warning time and have a strong ability to identify targets and backgrounds. This means that the Rafale can detect an air-to-air missile and issue a warning at a maximum distance of 15 kilometers, but the pilot cannot know the exact distance — which is crucial.

Assuming that the Rafale's indicated airspeed is 800 kilometers per hour at time t0, and the crossing angle with the PL-15's heading is 180° (head-on), with a distance of 15 kilometers between them. After receiving the warning, the Rafale performs a high-G (9G) turn. When it turns to a position perpendicular to the missile's flight path and maintains level flight, if the missile locks on again, it will then switch to vertical maneuvers to quickly exit the radar scan plane of the opponent. This is actually a maneuver to counter Phase-Shift Radar.

For AESA radar, however, this lock-breaking maneuver is ineffective. But if, during the process of the missile approaching the Rafale, the angular displacement of the Rafale relative to the guidance radar is greater than the radar's field of view plus the missile's turning angular velocity, lock-on can still be broken. However, after a simple simulation calculation, it was found that the angular displacement created by the Rafale's maneuver is far less than the latter, so it is impossible.

As for firing chaff flares, they are also ineffective against AESA radar.

There is one last method: turning around and running, escaping the missile's powered range before it catches up. There are believed to be successful examples of this. The relatively intact PL-15 wreckage from the 5.7 air combat is suspected to have self-destructed after exceeding its powered range. According to the engagement principles of the Pakistani Air Force at that time, safety was the top priority, and they fired at close to maximum range. If the target aircraft happened to turn and form a tail-chase situation with the missile, it might be able to escape the missile's powered range. But for the Rafale that has already entered the MAWS warning distance, escape is impossible. The maximum warning distance of the Rafale's passive MAWS is only 15 kilometers, and it cannot obtain the exact distance. Under the preset conditions mentioned above, after turning 180°, there would only be 4 seconds left, which is not enough time. This calls for obtaining warning information earlier — but according to previous speculation, the Rafale's RAW is insensitive to AESA radar (at least to the radar of the J-10C).

In this light, it appears that the current Rafale has almost no chance of escaping from the PL-15. Of course, the development of things always follows a spiral upward trend. The Rafale's warning equipment is actually designed for third-generation aircraft, so it is reasonable that it is being heavily targeted. When the Rafale is equipped with a targeted upgrade package, it may still have some fighting power. But by that time, it will not be facing the PL-15 anymore.