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On Ukraine's FPV Raid on Russian Rear Air Force Base

The recent Ukrainian attack can be viewed from two perspectives:

  1. The raid itself:
    • The operation proved highly successful, with the extent depending only on the number of Russian strategic aircraft confirmed damaged.
    • The attack on Siberia's Belaya base revealed significant Russian vulnerabilities and FSB failures. Compared to the KGB era, Russia now struggles in intelligence, counterterrorism, and anti - espionage. Previous incidents like assassinated generals and destroyed bridges highlight this ongoing issue.
    • Videos show Russian forces lack proper protection for key targets, partly due to the base's geographical location. There's a severe shortage of anti - drone systems, with aircraft left unprotected on runways without even basic nets. They still follow decades - old traditional deployment methods.
    • Ukrainian attack videos show no communication interference. While some FPV systems use fiber - optic guidance, the launch sites (disguised vehicles) require long - range communication capabilities. Without Starlink support, the operation would have failed.
    • The traditional front - and - rear war concept still exists in Russia, aiming to prevent domestic unrest from special military actions. However, Ukraine's attacks have shattered this notion across geographical, military, communication, and information dimensions, blurring the front - and - rear distinction.
    • Tactically, the raid succeeded, but strategically, it may not benefit Ukraine. Russian Aerospace Forces have underperformed in this war, so damage to strategic aircraft won't significantly impact ground offensives. Given Ukraine's ground - warfare setbacks, deep - strike special operations won't change the ground war dynamics but may prompt stronger Russian ground - war responses. Moreover, Russia could use these attacks to unify the nation and boost mobilization for the new - era war.
  2. Air supremacy:




    The attack aligns with the views in "Air Supremacy · Future Air Warfare." The Russian situation exemplifies the challenges of being unable to see or engage the enemy.

    As mentioned in the article, Russia recently showcased a supposed second - hand - market - sourced anti - drone laser defense system, reflecting the lack of a unified all - domain situational awareness system. Without it, existing equipment can't function effectively.


    In drone and counter - drone confrontations, high - speed data links are crucial. Communication jamming and anti - jamming capabilities are vital. The operation highlights Starlink's significance. In future wars, countering such systems will be a key challenge, especially as the U.S. advances Iron Dome, creating a complex situation. The spokesperson's response merits careful consideration.


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